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*Deborah E. Lipstadt*



## AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST

In recent years the topic of Allied rescue and refugee policy during the Holocaust has become a matter of growing scholarly and moral interest. In the decade since *Modern Judaism* first began publication, we have witnessed a veritable explosion of research on this topic. While much of the work which has appeared is of the highest scholarly caliber, it is clear that many of the authors who have addressed this topic have been motivated by personal or moral concerns as well. They have been perplexed and in certain cases angered by the American record.

How might they explain the fact that a country that is dedicated to the idea that it is a land of immigrants, barred its gates to those desperately in need of refuge during these years? Why in 1939 did a bill to rescue German children—many of whom would have been Jewish—meet such opposition, while a similar bill to rescue British children met none? How could it have refused during the war to use freely available transportation to take Jews to safety? Why in the summer of 1944 did it refuse to bomb Auschwitz but immediately go to the aid of the Polish Home Army when it revolted against the Nazis? Why did it agree to send food packages to Greek citizens whose nation had been occupied but refused to allow similar packages to be sent to Jews in ghettos and camps? Many of the areas of research have focused on the “power players,” e.g. the State Department, War Department and White House. Can the policies they pursued be attributed to wartime priorities, antisemitism, bureaucratic foul ups, lack of information or the parameters of Nazi actions against the Jews?

But there have been other kinds of inquiries, many of them designed to find *the* guilty party for the American failure to rescue. [Often these works have determined in advance who is responsible and then set out to prove it.] As the many credible works on this topic demonstrate, there was no one party or factor which alone was responsible for this unfortunate policy. Some of the works which have appeared on this topic have, in the words of the late Marie Syrkin, who was a member of the editorial board of the *Jewish Frontier* during this period and a first hand observer/participant in the formulation of American Jewish responses, “revised[d] the past for their own self-aggrandizement and unscrupulously distort[ed]

the historic record.” Often this distortion has been made to justify and legitimize contemporary Jewish political and institutional agendas.<sup>1</sup>

As virtually all of the works on this topic document, the Allies seemed almost perversely concerned that they would have to act to aid Jews. In 1944, President Roosevelt under public pressure generated in part by the Jewish activist group, the Bergson Boys, and internal pressure from members of his own administration, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau in particular, finally mandated that a War Refugee Board be created in order to facilitate the rescue of Jews and others facing persecution and annihilation. One Foreign Official complained that the Board was “part of a Zionist drive and is liable to make trouble for us in Palestine.” Even during the worst of the tragedy both Washington and London seemed to reject any suggestion for aiding Jews. Avenues of assistance which were readily adopted when they affected other groups were deemed inappropriate when they concerned Jews. The Allied authorities refused to send food relief to the ghettos because the food would “almost certainly” be diverted for the Germans’ personal use or would be given the Jews, thereby freeing the Germans of responsibility for caring for them. However, a massive food relief program for Greece was actively pursued. Funds for English children being held under German occupation in the Channel Islands were provided without debate. Funds to feed Jewish children in Rumania and France were not. Rescue plans were rejected because of “technical difficulties” which might be “embarrassing” to the Allies.

As additional archives are opened to researchers it becomes easier to trace the precise steps taken and often not taken by the Allies in relation to the question of the rescue of those Jews under the threat of extinction by the Nazis. There is now a fairly substantial body of literature on this topic. All of it, to one degree or another, conclusively demonstrates that the “bystanders”—America as well as the other Allied nations, neutral nations, the Vatican and international agencies such as the International Red Cross—accorded the rescue of the Jews a low priority at best. There is an increasing body of evidence which documents that at times the Allies—State Department and Foreign Office officials in particular—not only failed to pursue rescue opportunities but actually worked to frustrate and prevent the possibility of rescue.

Now the parameters of this field of research have expanded to include the post-war period. It is increasingly being demonstrated that the Allies not only failed to rescue the Jewish victims of the Nazis during the war but that after the war they actively sought to evade fulfilling their promise to punish the perpetrator. These books generally demonstrate the confluence of disbelief, indifference, antisemitism and political expediency which influenced Allied behavior. Another factor was the Allied refusal

to recognize the degree to which the Jews were engaged in a direct confrontation with the Nazis. They also illustrate the ironic fact that the Nazis were the only combatants willing to grant the Jews the status of a specific and targeted victim.

Let us now turn to the most important research on this topic, particularly that which has appeared in the past ten years. We begin with some of the earliest publications because they helped shape the direction of much of the subsequent studies. One of the first books to appear on this topic prompted not only a great deal of interest in this field but was the first work to pierce the protective shield in which American Jewry had encased the memory of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The fact that it was not a scholarly but more of a journalistic or a moral account, does not diminish the importance of Arthur Morse's *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy*.<sup>2</sup> It raised many questions which scholars subsequently went on to attempt to answer. Morse argues that the State Department was home to numerous antisemites, a number of whom had a direct hand in thwarting American rescue efforts. Morse's book was followed by Henry Feingold's *The Politics of Rescue*<sup>3</sup> and David Wyman's first work on this topic, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941*.<sup>4</sup> For a number of years these three works constituted the most important works on this topic. While Feingold analyzes American rescue and refugee policy from a political perspective from the Evian Conference in July 1938 to the opening of the death camps, his main focus is on the State Department. While critical of Roosevelt's "politics of gestures," Feingold finds the main obstacles to have been State Department officials, such as Breckinridge Long, who had direct control over American rescue policy. Feingold highlights the web of antisemitism, legalisms, xenophobia and, particularly in the case of the President, political calculations which helped choke off any real rescue efforts.

Wyman limits his examination of American refugee policy to the years 1938 to 1941. Though he covers much of the same ground as Feingold he graphically demonstrates the depth and breadth of American antisemitism during this period. When this antisemitism was coupled with the nativistic nationalism, economic crisis and isolationism, all of which characterized America during the later 1930s, it was a virtual certainty that rescue efforts would fail.

In the past decade the question of American policy has been examined in greater detail. These works have gone well beyond the earlier ones. Among the most noteworthy in this regard are Martin Gilbert's *Auschwitz and the Allies*<sup>5</sup> and David S. Wyman's *The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945*<sup>6</sup> which earns the distinction of being one of the few — if not only — historical works on this topic to be on the *New York*

*Times* Best Seller List. Both offer scathing condemnations of Roosevelt and the entire administration for their response to the persecution of the Jews. In a style for which he has become known in his Churchill biographies, Gilbert stays very close to his material, rarely speculating or even articulating that which his extensive documentation seems to make clear. Letting his documents speak for themselves, he carefully traces how a lack of "imagination, intelligence, initiative and sympathy," worked to frustrate the rescue of Jews. Some of the material Gilbert exposes is so damning of the State Department and the British Foreign Office that it becomes clear that at times they not only failed to rescue but *actively* worked to frustrate rescue efforts. Wyman forcefully and quite emotionally condemns Roosevelt for his failure to act and his callousness towards Jews. Wyman's meticulous and amazingly extensive research has resulted in one of the most impressive and comprehensive works on this topic. Typical of the kind of research he has done is his discovery, as a result of checking the President's appointment book, that Roosevelt had deliberately changed his schedule in order not to be in Washington on a day in October 1943 when he learned that 400 Orthodox rabbis had come to protest the failure to rescue. The President used a minor ceremonial occasion to escape through the White House's back door.

Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut's *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry 1933-1945*<sup>7</sup> covers similar territory but comes to a different conclusion. While they acknowledge both the inherent antisemitic sentiments of many of those who were responsible for the refugees and the extensive amount of popular American antisemitism, they do not attribute American inaction to it. They reject the notion that it was the personal antisemitism of Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long or any other bureaucrat including Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, which was responsible for Washington's rescue policy. They trace American policy to the interaction of four different variables: the State Department's bureaucratic infrastructure; the existing immigration laws; Americans' fundamental opposition to any change in the immigration laws; and President Roosevelt's reluctance to risk political support by undertaking humanitarian rescue efforts. They contend that even if there had been no antisemitism, bureaucratic indifference and the narrow interpretation of America's interests would have prevented most rescue efforts.

*American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945* does shift the pendulum to a more centrist analysis of American behavior during the war. While they may be correct that antisemitism was not the sole explanation for American policy, it certainly was more of a factor than the authors are willing to admit.

An area that Wyman raised but did not fully answer is the question of the bombing of the death camps. Was it feasible? [It was as of June

1944.<sup>8]</sup> Why then did the Allies refuse to undertake such an action. Currently the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum is conducting a symposium and series of lectures on the entire issue of strategic bombing. While this project encompasses far more than the question of the bombing of the camps, it should shed additional light on the strategic possibilities which existed and the decision not to undertake them.<sup>9</sup>

The one American exercise in rescue has been analyzed by Sharon R. Lowenstein in *Token Refugee: The Story of the Jewish Refugee Shelter at Oswego, 1944-1946*.<sup>10</sup> It is an important and well documented analysis.

Another set of queries regard the simple—yet critical—matter of information and its impact on public opinion. When did the Americans know about Final Solution? Was the information suppressed by the State Department? What could the public have known? Was the information presented to the broad American public in a way that made it believable? Wasn't the American failure to rescue really a reflection of the attitudes of the American public? Are those who assign responsibility to Roosevelt, the State Department or the Congress, not ignoring the fact that they were simply reflecting the American public's basic attitudes? Finally, in this context, there is a question which, though impossible to conclusively answer, still must be asked: is there reason to assume that had the American public been made fully aware of the depth of the tragedy taking place in Europe they would have pushed for a change in American policy?

Among the more significant books which deal with the release of information regarding the Final Solution is Walter Laqueur's *The Terrible Secret: Suppression of the Truth about Hitler's "Final Solution"*.<sup>11</sup> It charges that the Allies were aware of the Nazi intention to annihilate the Jews within a short time after the policy was initiated. Though Laqueur's book was accorded a great deal of attention because of this charge, the fact is that much of what he "revealed" had already been documented by those who worked in this field. Nonetheless in a forceful and well substantiated fashion he demonstrates that not only the Allies but the Vatican and the International Red cross all had precise access to the information regarding the annihilation of the Jews. Many refused to believe and even those who were willing to accept the news demonstrated a total lack of willingness to act.

My work on the American press coverage of the entire period, *Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1933-1945*,<sup>12</sup> while strictly an analysis of the way in which 400 American newspapers covered this topic, is at its heart an attempt to deal with the issue of information and knowledge, particularly in relation to public opinion. Unless we know what people knew and how they learned of it, we will never be able to fully determine the role of public opinion in formulating Ameri-

can policy. The press generally followed the government's lead and treated the news in a way that made it entirely "missable" or dismissable." The shortcomings in press coverage, even after the news was verified and confirmed by the Allies, are legion. The gap between information and knowledge is striking. Even when the press had the information it often buried it in inside pages where it could easily be missed.

It is important to understand, particularly in the light of the attempt to illuminate the question of the relationship between public opinion and American policy, that there is no guarantee that had the press covered this in a more forthright fashion that American rescue policy would have been different. In fact, there is good reason to believe that it would not have been. In England the coverage was far more forceful and comprehensive, yet the policy was no different. The question we must ask, however, is did the press fulfill its obligation to inform readers of events? Did it act, in Tocqueville's terms, as a "beacon"?<sup>13</sup>

Another area of concern and one which has not yet been fully dealt with by scholars, is the response of the American religious establishment. Were American churches outspoken in their calls to rescue or was the silence that typified the response by churches in other lands replicated here in America? Two of the most extensive treatments of this topic are in Wyman's *Abandonment* and in Robert Ross' *So It was True: The American Protestant Press and the Nazi Persecution of the Jews*.<sup>14</sup> Wyman not only condemns American governmental officials, he also takes precise aim at the American Protestant establishment. Writing with a passion that results, at least in part, from his being the grandson of two Protestant ministers, he demonstrates how the American religious establishment not only failed to be moved by this human tragedy but often behaved in a fashion that was antisemitic. Ross' work is a devastating analysis of the Protestant press which was, like many of its secular counterparts, maddeningly cautious. The Protestant press repeatedly alerted readers that even when reports of persecution were documented they should be treated with great skepticism. Ross convincingly demonstrates that the Protestant press used theological grounds to justify its failure to protest the Final Solution. Ross observes that "Christians were to either seek to convert Jews to the Christian faith or to pray for them. To affirm the Jews as Jews, religious or nonreligious, seems always to have been an unacceptable alternative." In the ultimate irony, after the war was over, rather than condemn those who had perpetrated this action the Protestant press reserved its anger for those who made the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan.

One of the most potent areas of research is the question of the behavior of American Jews. It is a field that is often politically manipulated

for political and institutional agendas. There are those who defend American Jewry's every decision and those who hold them "personally" responsible for the failure to rescue. [The most striking example of latter occurred a few years ago when Ariel Sharon, in an address to the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organization, accused the Jews of the free world of bearing the burden of guilt for their silence during the war.]<sup>15</sup>

Why did the Jewish community continue to have such faith in Franklin D. Roosevelt when his record on rescue was so dismal? Was it so paralyzed by fear of antisemitism that it failed to aid its fellow Jews in Europe? Was their fear of being accused of insufficient loyalties by calling for what might appear to be a diversion from the war effort justified or did it reflect their own insecurities? Had American Jewry spoken out forcefully could it have affected policy?

Critics argue that Rabbi Stephen S. Wise and other prominent Jewish leaders could have convinced Washington to abandon its policy of "rescue through victory," a policy which meant that when victory came there was virtually no one left to rescue. Wise has become "evil incarnate" for many of those who have researched American Jewry's response. Saul Friedman's *No Haven for the Oppressed: United States Policy Toward Jewish Refugees, 1938-1945*<sup>16</sup> is particularly critical of Wise. He believes that Wise compromised himself because of his close relationship with the President and served as a *shtadlan* who was more concerned about maintaining access to the White House than he was about serving as a real leader of his people. While it is correct that Wise and other high ranking American Jews, e.g. Felix Frankfurter, can be criticized for "clinging too closely to the coattails of Roosevelt," one must still ask what choices did they have? The Republicans were no more willing to engage in rescue than the Democrats.<sup>17</sup>

Wyman is convinced that the approach of the Bergson Boys was the correct one. Had American Jews taken a more forceful approach to this issue, as the small group associated with the Palestinian Jewish leader Peter Bergson [Hillel Kook] did, then there might have been a change in government policy, according to Wyman. Monty Penkower's *The Jews were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust*<sup>18</sup> takes a different view of Wise's behavior. His approach is closer to Feingold's. Penkower casts Stephen S. Wise not as a "court Jew" but rather as a tragic partner in the State Department's attempt to keep the news of the annihilation of the Jews a secret. Wise's main access to information was through the State Department. He knew that if he violated the trust of those sympathetic officials who were his conduit to the European sources of information, his ability to communicate with them would be blocked. He therefore had little choice but to keep silent when those in the State Department who were willing to keep him informed asked that he do so. He also



knew that there were many in Washington who would have preferred that he not be provided with this information. Had Wise publicized the news when it was first passed on to him he would have probably alienated officials in Washington and London. These officials had already made it unequivocally clear that the survival of European Jewry was not a high priority for them.

Kraut and Breitman also break with previous findings in their analysis of the American Jewish community. They believe that American Jews used all the means available to them—private pleas, mass public protest, and political pressure—to try to open America's gates to European Jews. They argue that American Jews were not, as some have contended, "docile" or paralyzed by fear of domestic antisemitism. Both those Jews who believed open protest was the most efficacious response and those who believed in quiet back door diplomacy worked "tirelessly to command the attention of the hydra-headed government bureaucracy in Washington." The authors believe that Jewish internecine warfare was a result of Jews' frustrations at their inability to move either the President or the bureaucracy.

While many American Jews did actively protest, many Jewish leaders were not moved by this crisis and did not alter their lives in order to respond to it. In 1939 the American Jewish Committee could not hold meetings on Sundays—even at times of crisis—because board members were in the country for the weekend. Whatever the cause of the Jewish civil wars, they did give the government officials an excuse for inaction.

Haskel Lookstein's *Where We Our Brothers' Keepers: The Public Response of American Jews to the Holocaust 1939-1944*<sup>19</sup> takes a sharply critical view of American Jewry. He condemns it for failing to respond forcefully. While he acknowledges that the Holocaust may have been "unstoppable" by American Jews, he argues that it should also have been "unbearable." And, as he and many others demonstrate, it was not. Lookstein has scrutinized the major newspapers and journals published in the Jewish community in order to analyze what he deems its "public" response. His decision not to examine the archives of the various Jewish organizations limits the scope of his work. Nonetheless, for those interested in knowing what a Jew who read a major Jewish periodical might have known, Lookstein's book is most important.

There are a number of works which deal with what American Jews and Jewish organizations did do. Moshe R. Gottlieb's *American Anti-Nazi Resistance, 1933-1941: An Historical Analysis*<sup>20</sup> is an in depth analysis of the boycott movement. The debate over a boycott of Germany reflected the varying views on American Jewish political behavior during this period. Yehuda Bauer's two volume study of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, *My Brother's Keeper: A History of the American Jewish*

*Joint Distribution Committee 1929-1933*<sup>21</sup> and *American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1939-1945*,<sup>22</sup> provides a valuable insight into the workings of one particular agency. While there is a great need for more detailed analyses of the workings of other Jewish organizations, Bauer's volumes, particularly the second one, concentrate more on Joint efforts at self-help in Europe and less on the precise workings of the American Jewish leadership. The Joint's representatives functioned as American Jewry's representatives in Europe. There is a certain irony here in that its American leadership was composed of anti-nationalist Jews. They were associated with organizations that opposed the efforts of the Zionist organizations. Nonetheless, in their efforts in Europe they came to be seen by both victims, bystanders and, to some degree, perpetrators as the representatives of an "imaginary world Jewish government."

Rafael Medoff's *The Deafening Silence*<sup>23</sup> typifies some of the more polemical works which have been written on this topic.<sup>24</sup> He is certainly correct that Wise and the entire leadership of the American Jewish community could have more actively campaigned on behalf of fellow Jews who were being slaughtered in Europe. Many of them were still burdened by a *sha still* mentality. Others were virtually blinded by a love for Roosevelt and a symbiotic identification with his liberal domestic policies. Even when they knew that Roosevelt was not doing all that was possible to aid European Jewry few among them saw voting for—or even threatening to vote for—a Republican candidate as a possible alternative.

Medoff is convinced that had these leaders more forcefully presented their case American policy could have been changed. In his attempt to prove his point and in a style which typifies some of the more accusatory works, he often fails to take all the evidence into consideration. He attributes the failure of bills such as the Wagner Rogers act to Jewish quiescence. This bill, introduced in the months following Kristalnacht, was designed to permit the entry of 20,000 German children into America. Though the bill initially met with a tremendous outpouring of support from many different quarters—including a broad range of the American press—it ultimately died in committee. Medoff contends that the failure of American Jews to engage in a vigorous public campaign for the bill—only two American Jewish leaders, Wise and the President of the Council of Jewish Federations, publicly testified on its behalf—guaranteed its defeat. He fails to note that the bill faced strong opposition from various "patriotic" and America First groups. One of their main contentions was that even though the bill made no reference to Jews it was actually designed to rescue only them. Given the fact that there was such strong support of the bill from so many different prominent individuals, Jewish leaders chose, in what was probably a politically prudent step, not

to stand at the forefront of the battle. There is nothing on record to indicate that their outspoken support would have changed the mind of restrictionist legislators.

Feingold, who acknowledged his failure to deal with the behavior of the Jewish community in *Politics of Rescue*, has tried to redress that situation in a number of essays. He joins those who argue that it would have been impossible for the Jews to have altered American public opinion or government policy.<sup>25</sup> Lucy Dawidowicz has also entered this fray. An intense opponent of the Bergson group, she has severely criticized those who have supported their position.<sup>26</sup>

Today we are quick to criticize these Jews for their failures. And there is much to criticize. But many of the more critical works have a fundamental shortcoming: they confuse the political and organizational status of the contemporary Jewish community with the community of forty five years ago. They also ignore the fact that American society of today is vastly different from that of fifty years ago when ethnic and religious political expression was frowned upon.

Finally, there is an entire gamut of issues to be considered in relationship to the postwar years. What was the extent of the American commitment to punishment of Nazi war criminals? Was there a concerted effort to allow Nazis who had participated in the killing process to come to America or did they slip in unobtrusively? How long did the Justice Department know about their presence here before it decided to pursue them?

Much of the research in this arena has been facilitated by the recent declassification of the files of the armies, air forces and navies of America and Britain and certain files of the American War Department, State Department and Treasury. In addition the special reports prepared by the Justice Department and the General Accounting Office have contained important revelations. Among the most striking are the findings that the United States knowingly brought known war criminals to America. This was documented in a 1985 investigation by the General Accounting Office. In addition to the war criminals who entered this country, documented evidence has revealed that the FBI and CIA and State Department and Defense Department all admitted to dealing with war criminals. Between 1945 and 1955 under "Project Paperclip" over 400 German and Austrian scientists had their files "sanitized" by American officials so that their connections to war crimes would be hidden. Among the best known case was that of the scientists who worked at Nordhausen, Wernher von Braun and Arthur Rudolph, both of whom played a crucial role in America's space program. When Rudolph's role in the death of thousands of slave laborers was discovered in 1984 he left the country rather than face charges of having committed war crimes.

This entire sordid saga has been documented in Tom Bower's *The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientist*.<sup>27</sup> This is not Bower's first foray into this topic. His book, *Pledge Betrayed*<sup>28</sup> explored why the Allies not only failed to capture many known Nazi war criminals but also assisted some in regaining influential positions in postwar Germany. An even fuller account of the American collaboration with Nazis after World War II and its impact on American foreign and domestic policy is contained in Christopher Simpson's *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and its Effects on the Cold War*.<sup>29</sup> The information provided by many of these officials helped shape America's perception of the Soviet threat in the post-war years. According to Simpson they misrepresented that threat.

Allan A. Ryan, Jr.'s *Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America*<sup>30</sup> is written from personal experience. Ryan was the director of the United States Office of Special Investigations and under his watch many of the most important prosecutions and revelations about the American role in the postwar harboring of Nazi war criminals were revealed. Ryan estimates that approximately 10,000 Nazi war criminals came to the United States, the majority of them Balts and Ukrainians. They came here under the terms of the 1948 Displaced Persons Act which prevented the vast majority of the Jewish survivors from coming. Only a subsequent emendation of the law changed that situation. That law, which has been called "the most antisemitic law in U.S. history," and America's treatment of the survivors of the camps is examined in Leonard Dinnerstein's *America and the Survivors of the Holocaust*.<sup>31</sup> It is a forceful and disturbing account of how the Army mistreated the refugees, at times subjecting them to far worse treatment than known war criminals. In one case when a camp was found to be in too poor condition to hold German prisoners of war, survivors were placed in it and Germans were hired as their guards. Dinnerstein's revelations demonstrate that even after the war antisemitism and a general disregard for the plight of the Jewish victims of Nazism continued to shape American policy. The actual experience of American soldiers who entered the camps and the refusal of many of their friends and family at home to believe their stories about the survivors they found there is contained in a modest but compelling volume by Robert Abzug, *Inside the Vicious Heart: Americans and the Liberation of Nazi Concentration Camps*.<sup>32</sup>

There are many areas which still need to be explored, including the behavior of specific Jewish organizations, the role of the Christian religious establishment<sup>33</sup> and, a story which is still unfolding, the experience of survivors of the Holocaust and their children and their contribution to American Jewish life.<sup>34</sup>

Research in many of these areas will be facilitated by documentary collections, particularly David Wyman's thirteen volume set of documents which are a portion of the source material he used for *The Abandonment*.

It will be useful to both scholars and students.<sup>35</sup> Another extremely important addition to the study of this field is the publication of the Garland series Archives of the Holocaust. Included in this series, which has been edited by Henry Friedlander and Sybil Milton, are the archives of the American Friends Service Committee, the Varian Fry Papers, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the Vaad Hatzala and the Jewish Labor Committee. They provide extensive detail on relief and rescue efforts as well the precise degree of knowledge of events in Europe. They will be an invaluable aid to researchers of all levels.<sup>36</sup>

Finally, a new perspective on the topic of America and the Holocaust is investigation of how contemporary America engages in remembrance. Though there have been earlier efforts on this topic<sup>37</sup> the most recent is contained in Judith Miller's *One By One By One*. In a compelling fashion, Miller investigates how six different countries, America among them, engage in remembering the Holocaust. It is a critically important addition to this topic.<sup>38</sup>

A field that could be defined on the basis of three books but fifteen years ago, has grown tremendously, particularly in the past decade. Both historians of the Holocaust and American historians have come to recognize that this story is a vital link in the history of this devastating experience.

It is a sobering and compelling story. There is little about it that is heartening or reassuring. The most striking aspect of it is the degree to which America in general and the Jewish community in particular seem to have learned its lessons. America's refugee policy has changed greatly, as has the behavior of the American Jewish community. Maybe both America and American Jews have made a small step towards fulfilling the Baal Shem Tov's dictum, the secret of redemption lies in remembrance.

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#### NOTES

1. Marie Syrkin, "American Jewry During the Holocaust," *Midstream* (October 1982), pp. 6-12. See also Bernard Wasserstein, "The Myth of 'Jewish Silence,'" *Midstream* (August/September 1980), p. 10.

2. Arthur D. Morse, *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy* (New York, 1967).

3. Henry L. Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945* (New York, 1980). The 1980 edition of this book contains an important additional chapter in which Feingold evaluates some of the directions of research at that time on this topic. That chapter originally appeared in *American Jewry History*.

4. David S. Wyman, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941* (Massachusetts, 1968).
5. Martin Gilbert, *Auschwitz and the Allies* (New York, 1980).
6. David S. Wyman, *The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945* (New York, 1984).
7. Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut, *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry 1933-1945* (Bloomington, 1987).
8. This was conclusively demonstrated by Wyman in *Abandonment*.
9. John Barrat, "Researchers Analyze Strategic Bombing During World War II," *Smithsonian Institution Research Reports* (Spring 1990), pp. 1,6.
10. Sharon R. Lowenstein, *Token Refuge: The Story of the Jewish Refugee Shelter at Oswego, 1944-1946* (Bloomington, 1986).
11. Walter Laqueur, *The Terrible Secret: Suppression of the Truth about Hitler's "Final Solution"* (Boston, 1980).
12. Deborah E. Lipstadt, *Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1933-1945* (New York, 1986).
13. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Vol II (New York, 1954), pp 119-120.
14. Robert Ross, *So It was True: The American Protestant Press and the Nazi Persecution of the Jews* (Minneapolis, 1980).
15. Wasserstein, "The Myth," p. 10.
16. Saul Friedman, *No Haven for the Oppressed: United States Policy Toward Jewish Refugees, 1938-1945* (Detroit, 1973).
17. Friedman, pp. 146-154, 230, 234.
18. Monty Penkower, *The Jews were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust* (Urbana, 1983).
19. Haskel Lookstein, *Where We Our Brothers' Keepers: The Public Response of American Jews to the Holocaust 1939-1944* (New York, 1985).
20. Moshe R. Gottlieb, *American Anti-Nazi Resistance, 1933-1941: An Historical Analysis* (New York: 1982).
21. Yehuda Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper: A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 1929-1933* (Philadelphia, 1974).
22. Yehuda Bauer, *American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1939-1945* (Detroit, 1981).
23. Rafael Medoff, *The Deafening Silence* (New York, 1987).
24. Another work on this topic is M.J. Nurenberger's *The Sacred and the Doomed: The Jewish Establishment vs. The Six Million* (New York, 1985). The book is essentially a history of the response of the American Jewish community written from the perspective of the Bergson group. It is of the same genre as Medoff's work. While these works are not historically balanced, to say the least, they are important in that they are a reflection of the passion that is still felt about the American Jewish response. To some degree the anger has increased rather than dissipated in recent years.
25. Henry L. Feingold, "Did American Jewry Do Enough During the Holocaust?" *B.G. Rudolph Lectures in Judaic Studies* (Syracuse, 1985).
26. Lucy Dawidowicz, "American Jews and the Holocaust." *New York Times Magazine*, April 18, 1983; idem., "Indicting American Jews," *Commentary*, Vol. 76, (June, 1983) pp. 36-44. Also see "Letters," *Commentary*, Vol. 76 (September, 1983), pp. 4-28.

27. Tom Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientist* (Boston, 1987).
28. Tom Bower, *Pledge Betrayed* (New York, 1982).
29. Christopher Simpson, *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and its Effects on the Cold War* (Boston, 1987).
30. Allan A. Ryan, Jr., *Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America* (New York, 1984).
31. Leonard Dinnerstein, *America and the Survivors of the Holocaust* (New York, 1982).
32. Robert Abzug, *Inside the Vicious Heart: Americans and the Liberation of Nazi Concentration Camps* (New York, 1985).
33. A related area of interest is the plight of Christian refugees. This has been addressed by Haim Genizi, *American Apathy: The Plight of Christian Refugees from Nazism*. (Ramat Gan, 1983).
34. It is clear that the many Holocaust memorials and museums being built in many American cities would not have occurred without the survivors.
35. David Wyman, *America and the Holocaust: A Thirteen Volume Set. Volume 10: Token Shipment [Oswego Camp], War Refugee Board "Summary Report," and Volume 11: War Refugee Board "Weekly Reports"* are currently available. The remaining volumes are still in preparation.
36. Friedlander, Henry and Milton, Sybil (eds.), *Archives of the Holocaust*, 18 Vols. (New York, 1990).
37. Deborah E. Lipstadt, "Invoking the Holocaust," *Judaism*, Vol. 30, No. 119 [1981], pp. 335-344.
38. Judith Miller, *One By One By One* (New York, 1990).